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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1959
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER H. CLARK, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
INTRODUCTION
As is commonly true in Colorado, the cases dealing with domestic
relations during the year 1958 were few in number and generally of
no more than local interest. The chief development was accomplished
by the Forty-First General Assembly in enacting a new statute on divorce
and separate maintenance.' Detailed discussion of this statute is outside
the scope of this article, but it will be mentioned in connection with the
cases to which it is relevant.
DIVORCE AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
In last year's review the writer risked the opinion that the Colorado
Supreme Court, in Carroll v. Carroll," had adopted a liberal definition
of cruelty. This statement was made without sufficient attention to the
supreme court's penchant for reversing itself sub silentio. This year, in
Reed v. Reed,' the court held that evidence substantially similar to that
I Colo. Lows 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, 38.
2 135 Cola. 379, 311 P.2d 709 (1957), discussed in Clark, One Year Review of Domestic Relations, 35
DICTA 36 (19581.
3 329 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1958).
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in the Carroll case did not amount to cruelty. The evidence outlined
by the court was that the defendant, the wife, had criticized the plain-
tiff's parents and his job, and that they had quarreled over their sex re-
lationship. There was evidence of two acts of physical violence. In short,
the activities revealed in the Reed case were very much like those in
the Carroll case, with the apparent difference that the plaintiff in the
Reed case did not testify that his wife's conduct affected his well-being,
health or peace of mind. Although the Reed opinion is anything but
enlightening on the point, it was this failure that seems to have per-
suaded the court that cruelty had not been proved. The Carroll case had
specifically stated that inferences may be allowed, but it now appears
that the court has repented of its more liberal view, although its failure
to cite Carroll leaves some doubts.
The chief authority for the Reed opinion is a quotation from Corpus
Juris Secundum' which in part follows the language of Evans v. Evans,'
the leading ecclesiastical case defining cruelty for eighteenth century
English practice. Aside from the question whether present conditions
in Colorado are such that an eighteenth century ecclesiastical authority
should govern our divorce law, this choice of authority can only increase
the hypocrisy which is already so distasteful a feature of divorce prac-
tice.' Divorce plaintiffs who are well advised must now go through the
empty ritual of testifying that their peace ol mind, health or well-being
were affected by the defendant's cruelty.
One other case this year suggested in a dictum that entering a
bigamous marriage would not necessarily amount to cruelty, at least if
the defendant had acted in good faith.7 The negative inference might
then exist that entering into a bigamous marriage in bad faith is cruelty.
This is of little importance in any event, since entering into a bigamous
marriage would necessarily involve adultery, another ground for divorce.'
The year also produced a group of cases involving the financial side
of divorce. In addition to reiterating the established rule that allowances
of alimony are within the discretion of the trial court, not to be upset
in the absence of arbitrary or unreasonable action,' the supreme court
had to pass on the effect of an alimony decree where installments were
not paid. In Jenner v. Jenner e it was held that each installment be-
comes a judgment debt as it matures, and that the trial court may at
any time enter a total judgment for the unpaid arrears without further
notice to the husband. If the court's reasoning is correct, it would seem
to follow that the wife could get execution at any time for the unpaid
amount, without going through the formality of getting a judgment
entered for the total. The Jenner case also held that although the wife's
4'27 C.J.S. Divorce § 28 (19411 to the effect that "mere rudeness of language, neglect, indifference,
petulance of manner, austerity of temper, or an occasional sally of passion or act of ill treatment which
does not injure the health of the complaining party does not constitute cruelty . ..-
61 Hagg. Con. 35, 38, 161 Eng. Rep. 466, 467 (1790): "Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners,
rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if
they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty."
e Any practitioner who has listened to divorce cases being tried must concede that the list of things
which Corpus Juris Secundum says do not amount to cruelty are exactly the things for which divorces are
granted every day in trial courts of Colorado and other states. To unnounce in appellate opinions that
this sort of thing is not cruelty cannot help but increase the disrespect in which many laymen hold courts,
lawyers and the law itself, It is no wonder that many successful and respected leaders of The bar look upon
divorce practice as beneath them.
* Schleiger v. Schteiger, 324 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1958).
* Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, § 2.
* Fitchett v. Fitchett, 320 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1958); Schleiger v. Schleiger, 324 P,2d 370 (Colo. 1958).
But see Vines v. Vines, 326 P.2d 662 (Cola. 1958) (supreme court reduced an award of alimony from $833.33
per month to $700 per month).
y0 330 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1958).
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laches might give the husband a defense to a contempt proceeding, it
does not prevent her from enforcing the judgment for the arrears.
In Rodgers v. Rodgers," a case commented on last year, 2 the su-
preme court held that awards of alimony and a property division could
be made after the divorce decree had become final, where both parties
had agreed in advance of decree that this should be done, and had in-
tended at all times to submit the property questions to the court. This
case raised but did not decide the question whether the property and
alimony questions might be foreclosed from later consideration if the
parties had not explicitly agreed that they should be decided after the
divorce was final. This question seems now to be answered by the new
divorce statute, which authorizes alimony to be awarded "at all times
after the filing of a complaint, whether before or after the issuance of a
divorce decree,"' 3 and authorizes property to be divided "at the time of
the issuance of a divorce decree, or at some reasonable time thereafter.""
"Decree" here means a final decree, since the new statute abolishes the
interlocutory decree."
The court this year also described the circumstances under which
a wife may be awarded part of her husband's property. Where she is
asking a divorce, and can show that she contributed either funds or
services beyond the usual duties of a homemaker, she is entitled to an
equitable award." Presumably this would hold true also under the new
divorce statute. Such awards resemble alimony more than property, and
give evidence that the court is influenced by the same considerations
which led to the adoption of community property laws in other states.
Where the wife is asking not a divorce, but separate maintenance,
the court has adopted other criteria. Vines v. Vines" held that the wife
in separate maintenance is only entitled to a share of her husband's
property where that is essential to assure her of support. In that case
the trial court had given the wife half of her husband's property in ad-
dition to a substantial monthly sum for support. The supreme court
said that the wife who seeks separate maintenance is entitled to main-
tenance and no more, so that as long as she is adequately supported, title
to her husband's property cannot be ordered transferred to her. The
court construed the separate maintenance statute, which authorized a
division of property "in a proper case,"" to mean that such a proper
case would not exist unless the division were necessary to secure support
for the wife.
The problem immediately arises whether this view of separate main-
tenance is to prevail under the new statute. That statute allows the
court to divide the property of the parties "as the circumstances of the
case may warrant," "in such proportions as may be fair and equitable."'"
This is very little more specific than the statute under which Vines v.
Vines was decided.
The new statute does remove one ground of the Vines case, however,
by providing that if a property division is ordered, neither party may
11 323 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958).
1" See Clork, One Year Review of Domestic Relalions, 35 DICTA 36, 37 (1958).
13 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, § 6, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-15 (1953).
14 Ibid.
" Colo. Laws Ist Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 37, § 8.
16 Britt v. Britt, 328 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1958).
"7 326 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1958).
"IColo. Rev. Stat. § 46-2-4 (1953).
19 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1958, c. 38, § 2.
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thereafter share in the estate of the other except by a will subsequently
executed. This provision makes it clear that property rights can be
decided, with finality, and that the wife has no chance of later receiving
a further benefit when her husband dies, unless he expressly provides for
her in his will. This makes separate maintenance bear a closer resem-
blance to divorce, and supports the conclusion that the new separate
maintenance statute should be so construed as to allow a property divi-
sion under the same circumstances in which it would be allowed in a
divorce case.
The doubts and problems which arise over the nature and effect of
separate maintenance underline the equivocal nature of the action and
its undesirable social consequences, the worst of which is that it leaves
the parties neither married nor single. This evil is not redeemed by the
slight possibility that the parties might be reconciled and resume marital
life.
One further problem arose during the year, the procedural question
of the extent of review of a divorce case where no transcript of the evi-
dence is made in the trial court. The supreme court said2" that under
these circumstances the findings of the trial court will be presumed to
be supported by the evidence. The supreme court's willingness sub-
stantially to forego review of a divorce case where, under Rule 80 (a) ,
no transcript is made contrasts with its requirement in adoption cases
that a reporter must be present and a transcript made." The solution
would seem to be a revision of Rule 80 (a) to require a transcript in all
courts of record.
CUSTODY, ADOPTION AND DEPENDENCY
The supreme court has always been more willing to re-examine the
decisions of trial courts on matters relating to children than to review
factual determinations in other types of cases. This year was no excep-
tion. The case which goes the farthest in this direction is Crites v.
Crites," where the supreme court overturned an award of custody in a
divorce case on the ground that it was "conceived in aggravation and
not based on any evidence," even though no reporter had been present
in the lower court, no transcript was made, and therefore it was impos-
sible to tell whether there was evidence to support the decree or not.
On the remand no requirement was made that the evidence should be
reported. This of course is inconsistent with the Schlieger case2" hold-
ing that in the absence of a transcript the trial court's decision will be
presumed to be supported by the evidence.
A still different approach was taken in Clerkin v. Geisendorfer,"
an adoption case in which abandonment by the child's father was in
issue. The trial court granted the adoption and the supreme court re-
versed, remanding the case with instructions that a reporter be present
at the trial and a transcript of the evidence made. This rule was made
to apply to all contested adoption cases. If the court is correct in its
reasoning that a transcript is required because of the state's interest in
the child's welfare, then a transcript should also be required in all chil-
20
Schleiger v. Schleiger, 324 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1958).
21 Colo. R. Civ. P. 80 la): "Unless the parties stipulate to the contrary, a master or district court
shall, and any other court in its discretion may. direct that evidence be taken stenographically and appoint
a reporter for that purpose."
22 See Clerkin v. Geisendorfer, 323 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1958), discussed in text at note 25, infra.
2 322 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1958).
24 Schleiger v. Schleiger, 324 P.2d 370 (Cola. 195).
25 323 P.2d 633 (Cola. 1958).
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dren's cases, whether adoption, dependency, divorce or relinquishment,
since the state's interest is equally great in all such actions. As indi-
cated above," the proper solution is a complete revision of Rule 80 (a),
and not a piecemeal revision via decisions in individual cases.
Another case involving children dealt with a conflict of jurisdiction
between the district court and the Denver Juvenile Court. In Johnson
v. Black"' the mother of a child had custody under a Colorado divorce
decree. She left the child with her parents, the child's maternal grand-
parents, for about four years, and at the time of the suit was living in
California. The grandparents filed a petition for adoption in the Den-
ver Juvenile Court," whereupon the mother filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the Denver District Court," asking that she be given custody
of the child. The grandparents then asked an original writ of prohibi-
tion from the supreme court, to prevent the district court from hearing
the habeas corpus action. The supreme court refused the writ, holding
that the district court had jurisdiction in habeas corpus to determine
whether the child was wrongfully restrained of his liberty, and that there
was no conflict between the decision as to custody by the district court
and the decision of the juvenile court on the adoption petition. The
supreme court did not discuss the question of just how the juvenile court
could enforce its adoption decree if the child's mother should be given
custody in the habeas corpus action and she should then take the child
to California.
Allowing the district court to go ahead with the habeas corpus
proceeding thus enabled the mother to frustrate any decree of adoption
which the juvenile court might give. The proper disposition of the
controversy would have been to order the district court to stay the
habeas corpus case pending the outcome of the adoption proceeding. If
the adoption were granted, then the mother would not be entitled to
custody. If the adoption were denied, then the distrct court could grant
habeas corpus and see that the mother obtained custody of her child.
The supreme court seems unable to look at children's cases other than
as mechanical applications of the rules of jurisdiction. It never seems
to occur to the court that at times a jurisdiction which clearly exists
should not be exercised. This is certainly a case where the district court
should have been made to stay its hand. Of course the other explana-
tion for the case is the supreme court's long-standing hostility to decrees
of the juvenile courts.
The same hostility can be seen in what was perhaps the most warmly
discussed domestic relations case of the year, Diernfeld v. People.' This
was a dependency case filed by the Colorado Springs probation officer
in the El Paso County Court. The child was illegitimate and had been
left by its mother with its maternal grandmother. The mother was serv-
ing her second term in the Colorado penitentiary and therefore was not
supporting the child. So far as appears, the child was well cared for by
its grandmother. The supreme court reversed a finding of dependency.
The basic difference between trial court and supreme court was on the
question whether a parent in Colorado may transfer the guardianship
of his child to whom he pleases, without court approval. The supreme
28 See text following note 22, supro.
27 322 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1958).
2SUnder Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 4-1-2 and 37-9-2 (1953).
' The applicable statute is Colo. Rev. Stat. § 65-1-2 (1953).
00 323 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1958).
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court held that he may, saying, "Clearly it is not the law that before a
child can be placed by a parent in temporary custody of a relative per-
mission must be first obtained from the court."'" The trial court had
ruled that the sole question in a dependency action was whether the
parents were properly caring for the child, and that it did not matter
that some other person was performing the parent's duties so long as
the parent was not performing them. Regardless of what one may think
about the wisdom of allowing a parent to transfer his child to others as
he might transfer a chattel, the supreme court's decision does not take
account of the applicable statute. The definition which the legislature
has adopted applies the term "dependent child" to any child under
eighteen:
"who has not proper parental care or guardianship; or who, in
the opinion of the court, is entitled to support or care by its
parent or parents, where it appears that the parent or parents
are failing or refusing to support or care for said child .... "
From the literal reading of the statute it therefore seems obvious that
the trial court's position was the correct one. A solution of this partic-
ular litigation which might be satisfactory would place temporary cus-
tody of the child in some agency,3 perhaps leaving it with the grand-
mother, providing there was some chance that the child's mother might
be able to care for it upon discharge from prison. If the chance that
the mother would be able to care for it were slight or non-existent, then
some permanent arrangement for care of the child should be made, and
if the child were adoptable as the trial court thought, then adoption
would appear the best solution. As a result of the supreme court's de-
cision, however, the child's status remains in doubt at least until the
mother's release, and perhaps after that if the mother provides no.better
care than she has in the past. Another dependency action appears prob-
able before this unfortunate child's status can be settled.
31 323 P 2d 628, 631 (Colo. 1958).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-1 (1953), defining a "dependent child." The supreme court has refused to
apply this definition in a long line of cases. See, e.g., Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421, 283 P.2d 162 (1955).
33 The dependency statute does not now specifically authorize a temporary order for protective custody,
but Cola. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-6 (1953) might well authorize such an order if liberally construed.
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